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THE STANDARD OF PROOF NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH
THAT A DEFENDANT HAS MATERIALLY
BREACHED A PLEA AGREEMENT
INTRODUCTION
Plea bargaining has become the most common method of criminal case
disposition in the United States.' Each party stands to benefit from a plea
bargain. The defendant bargains in order to receive the most lenient
treatment the court will afford him.2 The prosecutor bargains because
neither he nor the courts have the time or resources to prosecute fully
every criminal case.3
Plea bargaining serves a valuable social function4 only if both parties
comply with the agreement. A plea agreement is essentially a contract,5
1. It is estimated that approximately 90% of all criminal convictions are obtained
through guilty pleas, most of them in conjunction with a plea bargain. See Brady v.
United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 n.10 (1970); J. Bond, Plea Bargaining and Guilty Pleas
§ 1.02, at 2-3 (1978); W. LaFave & J. Israel, Criminal Procedure, § 20.1(c), at 767 (1985)
(quoting address of Chief Justice Burger at the ABA Annual Convention, N.Y. Tunes,
Aug. 11, 1970, at 24, col. 4); D. Newman, Conviction: The Determination of Guilt or
Innocence Without Trial 3 (1966); Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69
Calif. L. Rev. 652, 652 n.1 (1981); Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 U. Chi. L
Rev. 3, 9 (1978); Comment, Constitution Held to Afford Criminal Defendants a Right to
Specific Performance of Plea Proposals Under Appropriate Circumstances, Cooper v.
United States, 594 F.2d 12 (4th Cir. 1979), 9 Baltimore L. Rev. 295, 296 (1980) [hereinaf-
ter Right to Specific Performance]; Comment, Courts Can Vacate Plea Agreements If State
Proves Material Breach. State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 316 N.W. 2d 395 (1982), 66
Marq. L. Rev. 193, 211 n.97 (1982).
2. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); H. Lummus, The Trial Judge 46 (1937); Alschuler, The Chang-
ing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69 Calif. L. Rev. 652, 652 (1981). See also United States v.
Ramos, 572 F.2d 360, 363 n.2 (2d Cir. 1978) (indicating the legitimacy of "extend[ing]
leniency to a defendant who is willing to cooperate with the government") (Lumbard, J.,
concurring); Fielding v. LeFevre, 548 F.2d 1102, 1106 (2d Cir. 1977) (offer of more leni-
ent sentence upon a plea of guilty involves no constitutional violation); United States v.
Rodriguez, 429 F. Supp. 520, 524 n.5 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (same); United States v. Wiley,
184 F. Supp. 679, 685 (N.D. IM. 1960) ("[1]t is incorrect... to say... that a 'more severe
sentence' is imposed on one who stands trial. Rather, it is more correct. . . to say that a
defendant who stands trial is sentenced without leniency .... "). It is interesting to note,
however, that the Supreme Court has upheld the right of a court to consider a defend-
ant's failure to cooperate after pleading guilty, and therefore impose a more severe sen-
tence on the defendant. See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S 552, 559-62 (1980).
3. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 260 (1971) ("If every criminal charge were subjected to a full-scale trial, the
States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by many times the number of
judges and court facilities.").
4. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
5. See United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 887 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Fields, 766 F.2d 1161, 1168 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Mooney, 654 F.2d 482, 486
(7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. McIntosh, 612
F.2d 835, 837 (4th Cir. 1979); State v. Makinson, 35 Wash. App. 183, 185, 665 P.2d
1376, 1377 (1983) (McInturff, J., dissenting); In re Palodichuk, 22 Wash. App. 107, 110,
589 P.2d 269, 271 (1978). But see United States ex rel Selikoff v. Commissioner of Cor-
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and thus a legally enforceable exchange of promises, the breach of which
affords a legal remedy.6 If a party breaches the plea agreement, it may
not be enforced against the non-breaching party.' The non-breaching
party, on the other hand, is entitled to relief in the form of either rescis-
sion' or specific performance. 9
This contract, however, is unlike other contracts because of its consti-
tutional implications.10 Because a plea bargain involves a guilty plea by
the defendant, which entails a waiver of several important fifth and sixth
amendment rights,1 the defendant has a due process interest in this
agreement. 2 Similarly, because the government is held to a high level of
performance when it makes a promise to a citizen, 3 the defendant also
rection, 524 F.2d 650, 654 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[contract] principles are inapposite to the
ends of criminal justice"), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976).
6. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63 (1971); see also United States v.
Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1109-10 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (the court, in applying Santobello
by analogy to inmate negotiations during a prison riot, stated that the "decision in
Santobello ... involved fundamental principles of contract law, notably those concerning
mutually binding promises freely given in exchange for valid consideration"), cert de-
nied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); Restatement (Second) Contracts § 1, at 5 (1981) ("A contract
is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy ....").
7. See, e.g., Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 509 (1984) ("when the prosecution
breaches its promise with respect to an executed plea agreement, the defendant pleads
guilty on a false premise, and hence his conviction cannot stand"); United States v.
Wood, 780 F.2d 929, 932 (11 th Cir.) (per curiam) (defendant's "substantial breach" of an
agreement made the prosecutor's promise unenforceable), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 97
(1986); United States v. Donahey, 529 F.2d 831, 832 (5th Cir.) (where defendant did not
live up to her part of agreement, government was freed from obligation to perform as
promised), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976); United States v. Simmons, 537 F.2d 1260,
1261-62 (4th Cir. 1976) (same); State v. Warren, 124 Ariz. 396, 401, 604 P.2d 660, 665
(Ct. App. 1979) (where defendant is found to have breached plea agreement, state will no
longer be bound to perform under agreement); Gamble v. State, 95 Nev. 904, 907-08, 604
P.2d 335, 336-37 (1979) (per curiam) (prosecutor who can prove in pre-trial hearing that
defendant has materially breached a plea agreement is released from its obligations under
that agreement); State v. Hall, 32 Wash. App. 108, 109-10, 645 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1982)
(when prosecutor breaches an agreement defendant is entitled to withdraw his plea or
have agreement specifically enforced; if defendant breaches agreement, it cannot be en-
forced against prosecutor); State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 289, 389 N.W.2d 12, 33
(1986) (material and substantial breach of the plea agreement by prosecutor entitles de-
fendant to withdraw guilty plea). See also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262-63
(1971) (when defendant pleads guilty in reliance on prosecutor's promise, prosecutor
must fulfill that promise, because if he breaks it, the defendant is not bound to agreement
but rather, is entitled to relief in the form of either specific performance or withdrawal of
his guilty plea).
8. See infra note 69.
9. See infra note 70.
10. See infra note 49.
11. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 85.
13. See Palermo v. Warden, 545 F.2d 286, 296 (2d Cir. 1976) ("[F]undamental fair-
ness and public confidence in government officials require that prosecutors be held to
'meticulous standards of both promise and performance.' ") (quoting Correale v. United
States, 479 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1973)), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 (1977); Geisser v.
United States, 513 F.2d 862, 863 (5th Cir. 1975) ("This is an extraordinary case calling
for extraordinary action. It is a case of the great United States going back on its word in
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has a due process interest in being assured that the government does not
break its promise unless he has materially breached his end of the bar-
gain. 4 When a person has any "interest" for purposes of due process, he
cannot be deprived arbitrarily of that interest by the government.' 5
Thus, procedural due process dictates that if the defendant is alleged to
have breached his plea agreement, he must be afforded a hearing to deter-
mine whether he in fact has breached. 16 The government cannot unilat-
erally declare itself free from its obligations to the defendant.' 7
The question remaining, however, is what process is due within that
hearing."i In cases in which a defendant is alleged to have broken his
plea agreement by misconduct 19 amounting to a material breach, the
courts are divided on the question of the standard of proof the govern-
ment must meet to establish the defendant's breach.20
This Note explores the standards of proof used in a defendant's pre-
deprivation hearing.21 Part I discusses plea bargaining generally, ex-
a plea bargain made by the Department of Justice."); Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d
944, 947 (1st Cir. 1973) (prosecutors are held to "the most meticulous standards of both
promise and performance."); Kluttz v. Warden, 99 Nev. 681, 683, 669 P.2d 244, 245
(1983) (quoting Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 947 (1st Cir. 1973)); Gamble v.
State, 95 Nev. 904, 907-08, 604 P.2d 335, 337 (1979) (same).
14. See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
15. To prevent arbitrariness due process requires that the defendant be afforded no-
tice and a hearing. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-33 (1976); Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 603 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-
70,(1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S.
535, 541-42 (1971); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 377-79 (1971); Wisconsin v.
Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 436-37 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-61
(1970); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law 501-02 (1978).
16. See infra notes 77 & 96 and accompanying text.
17. See United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379, 1390 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981); United
States v. Simmons, 537 F.2d 1260, 1261-62 (4th Cir. 1976); State v. Warren, 124 Ariz.
396, 401, 604 P.2d 660, 665 (Ct. App. 1979); Ellison v. State, 56 Md. App. 567, 576, 468
A.2d 413, 417 (Ct. App. 1983); Gamble v. State, 95 Nev. 904, 908, 604 P.2d 335, 336-37
(1979) (per curiam); In re James, 96 Wash. 2d 847, 850, 640 P.2d 18, 20 (1982) (en banc).
18. See infra notes 78-81.
19. For purposes of this Note, the waiver of constitutional rights giving rise to a valid
and enforceable agreement is assumed. Thus, misconduct amounting to a material
breach of the agreement does not include a defendant's refusal to plead guilty. The fol-
lowing are examples of such misconduct. See United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885,
887 (7th Cir. 1986) (committing perjury before a grand jury); United States v. Donahey,
529 F.2d 831, 832 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976) (giving false
and evasive answers before a grand jury in another trial); State v. Hall, 32 Wash. App.
108, 110, 645 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1982) (fraudulently misrepresenting personal identity in
order to enter into and continue under a plea agreement with the prosecutor); In re
James, 96 Wash. 2d 847, 848, 640 P.2d 18, 19 (1982) (per curiam) (en banc) (being ar-
rested on two misdemeanor charges after a plea agreement was reached on a prior, in-
dependent criminal charge).
20. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
21. A pre-deprivation hearing is a hearing that occurs before the defendant is de-
prived of the benefits of his plea agreement. Although the defendant has a due process
interest that entitles him to such a hearing, the courts have not decided squarely whether
the deprivation occurs at the time the defendant is reindicted, or after reindictment but
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plains the contractual aspects of plea bargains, and identifies the source
of the constitutional implications of plea agreements. Part II outlines the
division of authority on the issue of the standard of proof, discusses the
rationale behind each standard of proof and applies these rationales to
the pre-deprivation hearing. This Note concludes that the most appro-
priate standard to adopt is preponderance of the evidence.
I. PLEA BARGAINING: GENERAL BACKGROUND
A plea bargain is an agreement between a prosecutor and a criminal
defendant. Typically, a prosecutor initiates the agreement with an offer
to drop some of the charges against the defendant or to make a favorable
sentence recommendation to the court in exchange for the defendant's
guilty plea to a lesser offense.22 A prosecutor often bargains for some-
thing in addition to the defendant's guilty plea, such as testimony in an-
other criminal prosecution.23 Although a prosecutor has wide discretion
to decide whether to plea bargain with a defendant and on what terms,24
he cannot compel a defendant to accept a plea bargain2" or to plead
guilty, since a guilty plea involves the defendant's unilateral waiver of
fifth and sixth amendment rights.26 The defendant, on the other hand,
before trial. For a discussion of the various procedures adopted by courts, see United
States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 888-89 (7th Cir. 1986). In procedural due process cases,
a hearing prior to any deprivation should be afforded, unless "the state successfully dem-
onstrates that 'some valid government interest is at stake that justifies postponing the
hearing until after the event.'" Tribe, supra note 15, at 544.
22. See D. Fellman, The Defendant's Rights Today 231 (1976); R. MeNamara, Con-
stitutional Limitations on Criminal Procedure § 12.02, at 180 (1982); Davidson & Kraus,
Plea Bargaining: Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion, 1979 Ann. Surv. Am. Law 27, 28
(1979) [hereinafter Prosecutorial Discretion]; Lefstein, Plea Bargaining and the Trial
Judge, the New ABA Standards, and the Need to Control Judicial Discretion, 59 N.C.L.
Rev. 477, 489 (1981); Note, Enforcement of Plea Bargaining Agreements, 51 N.C.L. Rev.
602, 602 (1973).
23. See United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 886-87 (7th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Donahey, 529 F.2d 831, 832 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976).
For other examples of such exchanges, see United States v. McCarthy, 445 F.2d 587, 591
(7th Cir. 1971) (defendant agreed to make full payment of all taxes, penalties and interest
in addition to pleading guilty to tax evasion); State v. Warren, 124 Ariz. 396, 399, 604
P.2d 660, 663 (Ct. App. 1979) (defendant agreed to cooperate with both federal and state
authorities and provide information relating to a homicide); State v. Marino, 100 Wash.
2d 719, 720-21, 674 P.2d 171, 172 (1984) (en banc) (defendant agreed to successfully
complete several therapy programs for child abuse); State v. Morley, 35 Wash. App. 45,
46-47, 665 P.2d 419, 420 (1983) (defendant agreed to enter an alcohol rehabilitation pro-
gram and maintain good behavior while on probation).
24. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978); Abrams, Internal Policy:
Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 2 (1971);
Prosecutorial Discretion, supra note 22, at 31-52.
25. See C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure, Rules of Criminal Procedure 11,
§ 175.1, at 637 n.8 (1982).
26. A guilty plea, as a waiver of constitutional rights, must be voluntary as well as
intelligent (also called "knowing"). See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 75 n.8 (1977);
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S, 238, 242-
43 (1969); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (1969); Machibroda v. United
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has no absolute right to plea bargain in the first instance.2
Once the parties agree, the defendant enters a guilty plea with the
court. After the judge has ascertained that the plea is voluntary" and
intelligent,2 9 he has the authority to accept or reject the plea. The de-
fendant has no absolute constitutional right to have a guilty plea ac-
cepted by a court.30 Until the judge accepts the plea and incorporates it
into the judgment of the court,3 the plea bargain is only an executory
agreement.32 Once the plea is accepted, however, the agreement is bind-
ing and constitutionally enforceable.33 At that point the government
must perform its part of the agreement, unless it is determined, in a hear-
ing that comports with due process, that the defendant is not entitled to
have the agreement enforced because he has materially breached.'
The Supreme Court has explained the pervasiveness of plea bargaining
in terms of the "mutuality of advantage" it confers on both defendants
and prosecutors. 35 The Court has stated that because each party receives
States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962). For a discussion of what constitutes a voluntary and
intelligent waiver, see infra note 84.
27. See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 561 (1977); Cooper v. United States, 594
F.2d 12, 19-20 (4th Cir. 1979); Wright, supra note 25, § 175.1, at 637 n.8.
28. See infra note 84.
29. See infra note 84.
30. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25, 38 n.l1 (1970); Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 719 (1962); United States
ex reL Selikoff v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 650, 653 (2d Cir. 1975), cerL denied, 425 U.S.
951 (1976). But see, Wright, supra note 25, § 175.1, at 646-47 & n.34 (citing United
States v. Griffin, 462 F. Supp. 928, 929 n.1 (D.C. Ark. (1978), where court stated that
there is no appropriate way for a court to prevent bargains where the prosecutor agrees to
drop part of the charges, since such promises are generally considered a matter of
prosecutorial discretion).
31. As is apparent from the courts' actions, a guilty plea must be accepted by a court
in order to be valid. See, eg., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 258 (1971) (in
describing the facts as they occurred in the court below, the Court stated that after the
defendant pleaded guilty, the judge then accepted the plea); United States v. Simmons,
537 F.2d 1260, 1261 (4th Cir. 1976) (after defendant pleaded guilty the judge accepted
plea); United States v. Resnick, 483 F.2d 354, 358 (5th Cir.) (defendant may withdraw
his guilty plea if the judge does not accept it), cerL denied, 414 U.S. 1008 (1973).
32. "A plea bargain standing alone is without constitutional significance; in itself it is
a mere executory agreement which, until embodied in the judgment of a court, does not
deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected interest. It is the
ensuing guilty plea that implicates the Constitution." Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504,
507-08 0984) (footnote omitted).
33. Id. at 507-08. See also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 267 (1971) (Doug-
las, J., concurring) (when a prosecutor breaks a binding agreement with a defendant, the
defendant is entitled to relief in the form of either specific performance or withdrawal of
his guilty plea, which is to be determined by deciding which remedy due process requires
in the particular circumstances of his case).
34. See United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 887-89 (7th Cir. 1986); State v. War-
ren, 124 Ariz. 396, 401, 604 P.2d 660, 665 (Ct App. 1979); In re James, 96 Wash. 2d
847, 849-50, 640 P.2d 18, 20 (1982) (per curiam); State v. Morley, 35 Wash. App. 45, 48,
665 P.2d 419, 421 (1983); State v. Hall, 32 Wash. App. 108, 110, 645 P.2d 1142, 1145
(1982); State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 412-14, 316 N.W.2d 395, 398-99 (1982). See
infra notes 65 & 68 and accompanying text.
35. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 508 & n.8 (1984) (discussing advantages
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a substantial benefit from the process and because it reduces the already
overburdened criminal court docket, 36 it is not only "essential," but "it is
to be encouraged. 37
For the defendant whose chances of acquittal are low, plea bargaining
limits his probable penalty38 because he is pleading guilty to a lesser of-
fense, or receiving a recommendation for a lower sentence. In addition,
plea bargaining limits both the defendant's idleness during pre-trial con-
finement39 and the inconvenience and expenses of trial,40 because once
the defendant pleads guilty, he is convicted automatically, and only sen-
tencing remains.41 For the prosecutor, plea bargaining conserves his lim-
ited time and resources for cases where there is weak proof of the
defendant's guilt.4 In addition, because the defendant begins serving his
sentence immediately, plea bargaining protects the public from danger-
ous persons who otherwise may engage in further criminal activity while
on pre-trial release,43 and expedites the process of rehabilitation."
conferred on each party to plea bargain); Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363
(1978) (same); Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (same); Santobello v. New
York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971) (same); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752
(1970) (same).
36. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); Brady v. United States,
397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); State v. Yoon, 66 Haw. 342, 346, 662 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1983)
(quoting Santobello, 404 U.S. 257 at 260); Right to Specific Performance, supra note 1, at
296.
37. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971); see Blackledge v. Allison, 431
U.S. 63, 71(1977); United States ex rel. Selikoff v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 650, 653 (2d
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976); State v. Yoon, 66 Haw. 342, 346, 662 P.2d
1112, 1115 (1983); State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 693, 357 A.2d 376, 380-81 (1976); State
v. Tourtellotte, 88 Wash. 2d 579, 582, 564 P.2d 799, 801 (1977) (citing Santobello, 404
U.S. at 260); see also W. Lafave & J. Israel, supra note 1, § 20.1, at 767 ("the United
States Supreme Court has now upheld [plea bargaining] as necessary and proper").
38. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978); Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 752 (1970); United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 888-89 (7th Cir. 1986)
(citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970)).
39. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
40. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
41. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Kercheval v. United States, 274
U.S. 220, 223 (1927); T. Marks & J. Reilly, Constitutional Criminal Procedure 134 (1979);
Note, Plea Bargaining: Is Contract Law or Constitutional Law the Governing Principle?,
11 N.C. Cent. L.J. 165, 167 (1979).
42. See Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977); Santobello v. New York, 404
U.S. 257, 260 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970); ABA Project on
Standards of Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty § 1.8(a)(vi) & com-
mentary, at 49-50 (Approved Draft 1968).
43. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971); State v. Yoon, 66 Haw. 342,
346 , 662 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1983) (quoting Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751-52
(1970)); W. Lafave & J. Israel, supra note 1, § 20.1, at 775 (same).
44. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 752 (1970); State v. Yoon, 66 Haw. 342, 347 , 662 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1983); ABA
Project on Standards of Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty
§ 1.8(a)(ii) & commentary, at 41-45 (Approved Draft 1968); W. Lafave & J. Israel, supra
note 1, § 20.1, at 775 (quoting Brady, 397 U.S. at 752 (1970)).
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A. The "Constitutional Contract" Theory of Plea Bargains
Although a plea bargain is essentially a contract,45 it is a peculiar crea-
ture of contract law. The exchange that effectuates the agreement is the
defendant's guilty plea" and its attendant waiver of constitutional
rights.47 Acceptance of the guilty plea by the court validates the agree-
ment and the waiver. A defendant who plea bargains thus has a due
process interest in assuring that the state will not arbitrarily deny him the
fulfillment of that agreement.4" Although contract law provides a frame-
work for legal analysis of plea bargain disputes, it is an imperfect
analogy.
4 9
The theory that a plea agreement is a "constitutional contract"50 has
two main facets: the application of contract law to plea agreements and
the due process interest of a defendant in the agreement.5 Although
principles of contract law guide the resolution of plea bargain disputes, 2
due process dictates the type of hearing required to resolve such disputes
and the remedies available53 to the non-breaching party for a broken plea
agreement.54 This "constitutional contract" theory is rooted in the
45. See supra note 5.
46. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507-08 (1984).
47. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
48. See infra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
49. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507-08 (1984); United States v. Calabrese,
645 F.2d 1379, 1390 (10th Cir.) (quoting Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262
(1971)), cert denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981); Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 15-20
(4th Cir. 1979); State v. Yoon, 66 Haw. 342, 348-49, 662 P.2d 1112, 1116 (1983) (citing
State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 413, 316 N.W. 2d 395, 399 (1982)); State v. Rivest, 106
Wis. 2d 406, 413, 316 N.W.2d 395, 399 (1982); State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 420, 316
N.W.2d 395, 399 (1982) (Abrahamson, J., dissenting); Note, Courts Can Vacate Plea
Agreements If State Proves Material Breach, 66 Marq. L. Rev. 193, 196-97 (1982) [herein-
after Courts Can Vacate Plea Agreements] (footnote omitted).
50. The phrase "constitutional contract" was used to characterize plea agreements in
Westen & Westin, A Constitutional Law of Remedies for Broken Plea Bargains, 66 Calif.
L. Rev. 471, 539 (1978).
51. See Courts Can Vacate Plea Agreements, supra note 49, at 195 (1982). See gener-
ally Westen & Westin, supra note 50, at 528-39 (1978) (analyzing plea agreements in
terms of two main aspects-the contractual aspect and the constitutional due process
implications of plea bargains).
52. See Brooks v. United States, 708 F.2d 1280, 1281-82 (7th Cir. 1983); United States
v. Mooney, 654 F.2d 482, 486 (7th Cir. 1981); United States v. Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379,
1390 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981); United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d
1229, 1233 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Amett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1979);
United States v. McIntosh, 612 F.2d 835, 837 (4th Cir. 1979).
53. Justice Douglas, in his concurring opinion in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257 (1971), indicated that the remedy to be awarded for an unexcused breach of a plea
agreement by a prosecutor is dictated by due process. See id. at 267 (Douglas, J.,
concurring).
54. See United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 888-89 (7th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Simmons, 537 F.2d 1260, 1261-62 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d
375, 378 (4th Cir. 1974); State v. Warren, 124 Ariz. 396, 401, 604 P.2d 660, 665 (Ct. App.
1979); In re James, 96 Wash. 2d 847, 849-50, 640 P.2d 18, 20 (1982); State v. Morley, 35
Wash. App. 45, 48, 665 P.2d 419, 421 (1983); State v. Hall, 32 Wash. App. 108, 109-10,
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Supreme Court decision of Santobello v. New York, s in which the Court
first stated that a plea agreement is a legally enforceable exchange of
promises, the breach of which the aggrieved party would be afforded a
remedy.5 6 The Court implied that this right of an aggrieved party to the
enforcement of a plea agreement and a remedy for its breach was a due
process right.57 The Court, however, neither specifically noted the anal-
ogy between contract law and plea agreements58 nor explicitly defined
the source of the constitutional rights that give defendants a right to en-
force such agreements.59
In the absence of a clear Supreme Court mandate, lower courts have
stated explicitly what Santobello only implied: that plea agreements are
essentially contracts to which contract law may be applied,"' and that the
due process clause is the source of the defendant's constitutional rights
645 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1982); State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 412-14, 316 N.W.2d 395,
398-99 (1982); G. Gunther, Constitutional Law 584-85 (11 th ed. 1985).
55. 404 U.S. 257 (1971).
56. Id. at 262-63.
57. Without further explanation, the majority stated that, with regard to a plea agree-
ment between the defendant and the state, a defendant is entitled to safeguards that
would insure that he receives "what is reasonably due in the circumstances." Id. at 262.
Justice Douglas, however, in his concurring opinion, clarified that the majority's rule
making plea agreements enforceable against a breaching party was of constitutional ori-
gin, and implied that this origin was the due process clause. He stated:
I join the opinion of the Court and favor a constitutional rule .... Where the
'plea bargain' is not kept by the prosecutor, the sentence must be vacated and
the state court will decide in light of the circumstances of each case whether due
process requires (a) that there be specific performance of the plea bargain or
(b) that the defendant be given the option to go to trial on the original charges.
Id. at 267 (Douglas, J., concurring).
Indeed, the rule had to be constitutional in origin, or the Court would have been with-
out jurisdiction to reverse a state criminal case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1970). In addi-
tion, Justice Douglas noted that "[t]his is a state case over which we have no 'supervisory'
jurisdiction," which further indicates that the Court's decision had to be constitutionally
based in order to give the Court jurisdiction over the case. Santobello, 404 U.S. at 266
(Douglas, J., concurring).
58. Although the Court held plea agreements to be an enforceable exchange of
promises, the breach of which the law affords a remedy, the Court did not explicitly use
the term "contract" to describe such agreements.
59. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. See also W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra
note 1, § 20.2, at 784-85; Westen & Westin, supra note 50, at 474-76, 518 n.161 (1978).
After Santobello, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that plea agreements implicate constitu-
tional rights, but only clarified the Santobello decision to the extent of declaring that plea
agreements become constitutionally protected and enforceable only after a defendant has
pleaded guilty. See Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504, 507-08 (1984).
60. See United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 887-88 (7th Cir. 1986); United States
v. Fields, 766 F.2d 1161, 1168 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Strawser, 739 F.2d 1226,
1230 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038 (1984); Brooks v. United States, 708 F.2d
1280, 1281-82 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Delegal, 678 F.2d 47, 50-51 (7th Cir.
1982); United States v. Krasn, 614 F.2d 1229, 1233 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Arnett, 628 F.2d 1162, 1164 (9th Cir. 1979); United States v. McIntosh, 612 F.2d 835,
837 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1109-10 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); In re Palodichuk, 22 Wash. App. 107, 110-11, 589 P.2d
269, 271 (1978); State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 413-14, 316 N.W.2d 395, 399 (1982).
But see United States ex rel. Selikofi v. Commissioner of Correction, 524 F.2d 650, 654
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implied in plea agreements.6 '
B. The Application of Contract Law to Plea Agreements
A plea agreement obligates both parties to perform.62 In Santobello,
the Supreme Court held that when a defendant is induced to plea bargain
chiefly because of a prosecutor's promises, such promises must be ful-
filled.63 Conversely, if a defendant materially breaches the terms of a
plea bargain," the government is relieved of its obligations under that
agreement. 6' This mutuality of obligation is consistent with the "mutu-
ality of advantage" rationale of plea bargaining.66 Courts that have ad-
dressed plea bargain disputes have used to some extent a contract law
framework and terminology to analyze and describe plea agreements.67
(2d Cir. 1975) (contract law principles "are inapposite to the ends of criminal justice"),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976).
61. See United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379, 1390 (10th Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1982);
Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 18 n.8 (4th Cir. 1979); State v. Yoon, 66 Haw. 342,
347-48, 662 P.2d 1112, 1115 (1983); State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 413-14, 316 N.W.2d
395, 399 (1982); Austin v. State, 49 Wis. 2d 727, 736, 183 N.W.2d 56, 61 (1971) (relying
on Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957)); Westen & Westin, supra note 50, at 517-
18.
62. See United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting
Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971)); United States v. Simmons, 537 F.2d
1260, 1261-62 (4th Cir. 1976); State v. Warren, 124 Ariz. 396, 401, 604 P.2d 660, 665
(1979) (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971)); In re Troglin, 51 Cal. App.
3d 434, 438, 124 Cal. Rptr. 234, 237 (1975); Gamble v. State, 95 Nev. 904, 907-08, 604
P.2d 335, 337 (1979); In re James, 96 Wash.2d 847, 850, 640 P.2d 18, 20 (1982) (en banc)
(per curiam); State v. Morley, 35 Wash. App. 45, 48, 665 P.2d 419, 420-21 (1983) (quot-
ing In re James, 96 Wash. 2d 847, 640 P.2d 18 (1982)); State v. Hall, 32 Wash. App. 108,
110, 645 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1982).
63. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971). Accord Mabry v. Johnson,
467 U.S. 504, 509, (1984); United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Strawser, 739 F.2d 1226, 1229 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1038
(1984); United States v. Perkins, 503 F. Supp. 1107, 1112 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
64. See supra note 19 for a representative listing of the kind of breaches that warrant
the vacation of a plea agreement between a defendant and the government.
65. See United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Wood, 780 F.2d 929, 932 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 97 (1986); United States v.
Calabrese, 645 F.2d 1379, 1390 (10th Cir.), cerL denied, 451 U.S. 1018 (1981); United
States v. Stirling, 571 F.2d 708, 731-32 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978);
United States v. Simmons, 537 F.2d 1260, 1261 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. McCar-
thy, 445 F.2d 587, 591 (7th Cir. 1971).
66. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
67. Issues of general contract law typically arise in plea bargaining disputes. Exam-
ples include whether an agreement was reached, see United States v. James, 532 F.2d 1161,
1162-63 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 840 (1976); Commonwealth v. Tirrell, 382 Mass.
502, 505-06, 416 N.E.2d 1357, 1359 (1981); whether evidence admitted shows that a
promise was made, see United States v. Hammerman, 528 F.2d 326, 330-31 (4th Cir.
1975); Schoultz v. Hocker, 469 F.2d 681, 682 (9th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); United States
v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 427-28 (4th Cir. 1972); the terms of the agreement, see Brooks v.
United States, 708 F.2d 1280, 1282-83 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Mooney, 654 F.2d
482, 486 (7th Cir. 1981); Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 946-47 (Ist Cir. 1973);
State v. Yoon, 66 Haw. 342, 345-46, 662 P.2d 1112, 1114-15 (1983); whether one party
entered voluntarily or under duress, see United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099, 1109-
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Courts hold that a party is bound to perform under a plea agreement
unless excused by the other party's material breach.6"
The remedies available for a breach of a plea agreement, rescission 69
and specific performance,7 ° are among the remedies available to an ag-
grieved party in a commercial contract.7 The application of remedies,
however, demonstrates that the contract law analogy is imperfect. It is
limited by the defendant's fundamental due process rights in the agree-
ment. The remedies available to a prosecutor and a defendant differ. If a
prosecutor materially breaches, the defendant is granted either rescission
or specific performance.72 Yet, if the defendant materially breaches, the
10 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 961 (1976); whether one party breached its
promise, see United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 888-89 (7th Cir. 1986); Brooks v.
United States, 708 F.2d 1280, 1281 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Simmons, 537 F.2d
1260, 1261-62 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Donahey, 529 F.2d 831, 832 (5th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976).
In addition, the terminology sometimes used to describe plea agreements is also that
used to describe commercial contracts, see Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262
(1971) (when the promise of the prosecutor "can be said to be part of the inducement or
consideration," the promise must be fulfilled); United States v. Simmons, 537 F.2d 1260,
1261 (4th Cir. 1976) (condition precedent); Ellison v. State, 56 Md. App. 567, 577, 468
A.2d 413, 418 (1983) (express condition); State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 412, 316
N.W.2d 395, 398 (1982) (condition precedent) (quoting Simmons, 537 F.2d at 1261).
68. See supra note 62. See also J. Calamari & J. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § I 1-
22, at 407 (2d ed. 1977) ("If the breach is material ... [and] the breaching party's per-
formance is a constructive condition to the aggrieved party's duty of performance the
latter may also treat the material breach as a failure of condition. In other words, he has
the power to cancel the contract.") (footnote omitted).
69. When a court vacates a plea agreement, it is the functional equivalent of the tradi-
tional contract remedy of rescission. See Westen & Westin, supra note 50, at 510; see,
e.g., United States v. Wood, 780 F.2d 929, 932 (1 1th Cir.) (per curiam) (when defendant
breached agreement, it was nullified and the state thereby released from its promises),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 97 (1986); United States v. McCarthy, 445 F.2d 587, 591 (7th Cir.
1971) (when defendant did not fulfill his part of agreement, court held government enti-
tled to a "rescission" of the agreement); State v. Curry, 49 Ohio App. 2d 180, 183, 359
N.E.2d 1379, 1381 (1976) ("If the defendant has not fulfilled his part of the bargain, the
trial court may, at its option, proceed to sentencing or vacate the pleas and require the
defendant to stand trial.") (emphasis in original); State v. Hall, 32 Wash. App. 108, 110,
645 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1982) (since defendant breached agreement, prosecutor was entitled
to "rescission" of that agreement). See also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 268
(1971) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (calling vacating a plea
"rescinding the plea").
70. See, e.g., Geisser v. United States, 554 F.2d 698, 706 (5th Cir. 1977); Palermo v.
Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed,
431 U.S. 911 (1977); United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375, 378 (4th Cir. 1974); State v.
Tourtellotte, 88 Wash. 2d 579, 585, 564 P.2d 799, 803 (1977) (en banc); State v. Pope, 17
Wash. App. 609, 614, 564 P.2d 1179, 1181 (1977).
71. See Restatement (Second) Contracts § 359 (c), at 170 (rescission) & § 357, at 163
(specific performance) (1981); J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 68, § 11-22, at 407
(rescission), §§ 16-1 through 16-6, at 581-88 (specific performance); D. Dobbs, Handbook
on the Law of Remedies § 12.2, at 795-97 (1973).
72. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971) (stating the lower court has
discretion to award whichever remedy may be required under the circumstances of a
case); Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 296-97 (2d Cir.
1976) (affirming district court's grant of specific performance of plea agreement), cert.
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prosecutor can only rescind. A prosecutor is not entitled to specific per-
formance by a defendant because it is unconstitutional to compel a crimi-
nal defendant to plead guilty.73 Therefore, while contract analogies are
important to the resolution of issues arising under a plea agreement, such
analogies are not absolute.
C. The Defendant's Due Process Interest in the Plea Agreement
A due process analysis involves two steps.74 The first step inquires
whether the defendant has a protected "interest" for purposes of proce-
dural due process.7" A procedural due process interest must derive from
a right created in either state law or in the federal Bill of Rights.76 If the
defendant has such an interest, he is entitled to a pre-deprivation hear-
ing.77 The second step involves what process is due within that hear-
ing.7" This varies depending on the nature of the protected interest.7 9
dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 (1977); United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375, 378 (4th Cir. 1974)
(recognizing choice given to courts in Santobello but granting the defendant his prefer-
ence of specific performance); State v. Pope, 17 Wash. App. 609, 614, 564 P.2d 1179,
1182 (1977) (if defendant has performed under the agreement but prosecutor has
breached, court will choose whether the defendant is entitled to rescission or specific
performance).
73. See Kisamore v. State, 286 Md. 654, 656, 409 A.2d 719, 721 (1980) (prosecutor is
not entitled to specific performance) (quoting State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 697, 357
A. 2d 376, 383 (1976)); State v. Brockman, 277 Md. 687, 697, 357 A.2d 376, 383 (1976);
see also R. McNamara, supra note 1, § 12.15, at 193 (prosecutor is never entitled to
specific performance of an agreement).
74. See G. Gunther, Constitutional Law, 567-68, 584-85 (1 Ith ed. 1985); L. Tribe,
supra note 15, at 532-33.
75. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599-603 (1972) (discussing whether
teacher had a due process interest in his employment contract with a state university);
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-71 (1972) (same); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471,481 (1972) ("The question is... whether the nature of the interest is one within
the contemplation of the 'liberty or property' language of the Fourteenth Amendment.");
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971) (considering whether a driver's license consti-
tuted liberty or property under the fourteenth amendment); G. Gunther, supra note 74, at
567-68; L. Tribe, supra note 15, at 507, 533.
76. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710 n.5 (1976).
77. The pre-deprivation hearing provides the notice and opportunity to be heard re-
quired by due process. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 16 &
n.17 (1978); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976); Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 603 (1972); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 & n.7 (1972);
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 484 (1972); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 542 (1971)
(quoting Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950));
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-61 0970). A pre-deprivation hearing is required
unless the due process interest is outweighed by an important governmental interest that
makes such a procedure infeasible. In such a case an adequate post-deprivation hearing
will suffice. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431
U.S. 816, 848 (1977) (quoting Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7 (1972)
(quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371, 379 (1971); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 263 n.10 (1970); L. Tribe, supra
note 15, at 544.
78. See G. Gunther, supra note 74, at 584-85; L. Tribe, supra note 15, at 507, 533; see
also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-69 (1982) (after stating that parents had due
process interest, court discussed standard of proof required in hearing to terminate par-
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Among the issues considered are the type of hearing"0 and burden of
proof'1 required.
It is well established that when a defendant enters into a binding plea
agreement, he has a due process right in the fulfillment of that agree-
ment. 2 It is this due process right that gives the defendant an "interest"
for purposes of procedural due process and entitles him to a pre-depriva-
tion hearing before the state is excused from performance under an
agreement.8 3 Lower courts have identified two possible sources of this
due process interest: the waiver of constitutional rights involved in a
ent's custody of their natural children); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 13-16 (1981) (after
finding due process interest, court held that due process required the state to pay for
blood grouping tests in state-involved paternity action when the defendant is indigent);
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 19-22 (1978) (because customers
have due process interest in utility services, municipal utility must allow them an oppor-
tunity to meet with an employee who has authority to settle billing disputes before it can
terminate their services); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1976) (discussing
factors to be balanced when deciding what process is due once due process interest is
identified); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-65 0970) (because recipients have due
process interest in welfare benefits, they must be afforded pre-deprivation hearing similar
to judicial trial before benefits may be cut off).
79. In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 0976), Justice Powell explained that
" '[d]ue process', unlike some legal rules, is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances." "[D]ue process is
flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation de-
mands." Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the administrative proce-
dures provided [in a due process case] are constitutionally sufficient requires
analysis of the governmental and private interests that are affected.
Id. at 334 (citations omitted).
80. See, e.g., Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 22 (1978)
(meeting with an employee having authority to handle billing disputes required before
utility can be cut off); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 847-56
(1977) (informal procedures required before a foster child may be removed from a foster
home); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 260-65 0970) (hearing similar to a judicial hear-
ing required to terminate welfare benefits).
81. See, e.g., Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (clear and convincing
standard of proof required under due process to prove permanent neglect before termi-
nating parents' custody of their children); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431-33
(1979) (due process requires clear and convincing standard of proof to civilly commit a
person); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (due process requires beyond a reason-
able doubt standard of proof to prove criminal charges in civil juvenile delinquency pro-
ceeding); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285-86 (1966) ("clear, unequivocal, and
convincing evidence" standard of proof required under due process to prove grounds for
deportation).
82. See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
83. The defendant clearly has a due process interest in the agreement, see supra notes
85 & 87 and accompanying text. Accordingly, the defendant is entitled to a pre-depriva-
tion hearing, see United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 888-89 (7th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Simmons, 537 F.2d 1260, 1261 (4th Cir. 1976); State v. Warren, 124 Ariz. 396,
401, 604 P.2d 660, 665 (Ct. App. 1979); State v. Marino, 100 Wash. 2d 719, 723-25, 674
P.2d 171, 173-74 (1984); In re James, 96 Wash. 2d 847, 849-50, 640 P.2d 18, 20 (1982) (en
banc); State v. Morley, 35 Wash. App. 45, 48, 665 P.2d 419, 421 (1983) (quoting In re
James, 96 Wash. 2d 847, 640 P.2d 18 (1982)); State v. Hall, 32 Wash. App. 108, 110, 645
P.2d 1143, 1145 (1982); State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 411-13, 316 N.W.2d 395, 398-99
(1982).
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guilty plea, and an expectation interest in the state's performance of its
promises.
1. The Waiver of Constitutional Rights
The defendant's decision to plead guilty constitutes a valid waiver of
fifth and sixth amendment rights.8 4 Accordingly, this waiver gives rise to
a right of the defendant to be assured that the state will not arbitrarily
deprive him of the agreement that caused him to waive such important
rights. 8
5
84. The guilty plea required to constitutionally validate a plea agreement entails the
waiver of several fifth and sixth amendment rights. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S.
257, 264 (1971) (Douglas, J., concurring); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748
(1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969); Gamble v. State, 95 Nev. 904, 907,
604 P.2d 335, 337 (1979); In re James, 96 Wash. 2d 847, 849, 640 P.2d 18, 19 (1982) (en
banc); State v. Makinson, 35 Wash. App. 183, 185, 665 P.2d 1376, 1377 (1983) (Mclnturff,
J., dissenting). The fundamental rights waived by a guilty plea are the right to trial by
jury, see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 148-58 (1968), to confront one's accusers, see
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965), to present witnesses in one's defense, see
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 17-19 (1967), to remain silent, see Malloy v. Hogan,
378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964), and to be convicted by proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every
element of the crime charged, see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). The Court in
Brady also stated that a guilty plea involves the waiver of the fifth amendment right
against self-incrimination. Brady, 397 U.S. at 748.
A waiver of constitutional rights must always be voluntary. See id. The requirement
that a guilty plea be "voluntary" means that the plea must be a willful and informed
choice of the defendant, without threats, bribes, or misrepresentations by the state. See id.
at 755; Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224 (1927); Shelton v. United States,
246 F.2d 571, 572 n.2 (5th Cir. 1957), reversed on other grounds, 356 U.S. 26 (1958);
Westin & Westin, supra note 50, at 478-79 (1978). A waiver of constitutional rights must
also be intelligent. The requirement that a guilty plea be "intelligent" means that the
defendant must be aware of the nature and elements of the charges against him, see Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 n.6 (1970); see also Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S.
637, 645 (1976) (if defendant is not aware of the nature and elements of the crime
charged, his admission of guilt is not intelligent and therefore involuntary), and of all the
probable and material consequences of his guilty plea (e.g., maximum sentence), see
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970) (an intelligent guilty plea requires
knowledge of "alternative courses"); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749 n.6 (1970);
Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (1962) (citing Kercheval v. United
States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927)); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 223 (1927).
The record must clearly show that the defendant is aware of all of the above and of the
constitutional rights he is waiving by entering a guilty plea. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395
U.S. 238, 243 & n.5 (1969). Due process also requires that the defendant's decision to
plead guilty must be made only after he has consulted with counsel, absent a waiver of his
right to counsel. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 265 (1971) (Douglas, J., con-
curring); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 & n.6 (1970); White v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 59, 60 (1963); Moore v. Michigan, 355 U.S. 155, 160-61 (1957). This waiver also
must be made with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and the likely con-
sequences. See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1966); Adams v. United States ex rel.
McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942) (must be an intelligent waiver); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458, 464 (1938). These same principles have been applied specifically to plea agree-
ments because courts acknowledge that a guilty plea is such a waiver that gives rise to the
defendant's due process interest. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970);
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-43 (1969); Gamble v. State, 95 Nev. 904, 907-08,
604 P.2d 335, 337 (1979).
85. Several courts indicate that if the right to enforcement of the plea agreement is
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Courts after Santobello clearly indicate that this waiver of fifth and
sixth amendment rights gives the defendant a due process interest in a
plea agreement.86
2. The "Expectation" Interest
Some courts acknowledge a second source of the defendant's due pro-
cess interest. This is an interest in having expectations fulfilled that were
created by promises made to the defendant by the state.8 7
not observed, it renders the waiver of fifth and sixth amendment rights underlying the
guilty plea involuntary and unintelligent. An involuntary or unintelligent waiver of con-
stitutional rights is violative of due process. See supra note 84. Thus, the defendant has a
due process interest in the enforcement of the prosecutor's promise that induced his
guilty plea, unless the prosecutor is excused from fulfilling that promise by the defend-
ant's material breach. See, e.g., Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 18 n.8 (4th Cir.
1979) ("In cases where guilty pleas have already been entered before the government has
reneged, many courts, including this one, have apparently considered that the constitu-
tional rights most directly, and perhaps solely, involved are those that protect against
involuntary and unintelligent guilty pleas."); Gamble v. State, 95 Nev. 904, 907-08, 604
P.2d 335, 337 (1979) ("Since the defendant relinquishes constitutional protections by
pleading guilty, a waiver of those protections must be knowingly and voluntarily made;
and it is obvious that a waiver induced by an unkept promise cannot be valid. The [gov-
ernment] is held to 'the most meticulous standards of both promise and performance'
precisely because 'it is the defendant's rights which are being violated when the plea
agreement is broken or meaningless.'" (quoting Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944,
947 (1st Cir. 1973))); State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 420, 316 N.W.2d 395, 402 (Abra-
hamson, J., dissenting) ("One [constitutional] principle [involved in plea agreement pro-
tections] is the due process rights of the defendant which are implicated in the
repudiation of a plea agreement. The state's refusal to honor a plea agreement after a
guilty plea has been entered may undermine the voluntariness of the plea. . . .") (citations
omitted); State v. Marino, 100 Wash. 2d 719, 725, 674 P.2d 171, 174 (1984) (en banc)
("[B]ecause important constitutional rights have been waived, the accused is entitled to
judicial enforcement of the terms of the agreement."); State v. Tourtellotte, 88 Wash. 2d
579, 583-84, 564 P.2d 799, 801-02 (1977) (en banc) ("A plea of guilty constitutes a waiver
of significant [fifth and sixth amendment] rights by the defendant", and "[w]hen the pros-
ecutor breaks the plea bargain, he undercuts the basis for the [defendant's] waiver of
constitutional rights implicit in the plea."); W. Lafave & J. Israel, supra note 1, § 20.2, at
785 (indicating that the possible source of the defendant's right to constitutional protec-
tion of plea agreements is the due process requirement that guilty pleas be voluntary, "for
that requirement reflects the notion that the defendant has a constitutional interest in
making an informed choice and that the state cannot mislead the defendant into making a
disadvantageous choice.").
86. See supra note 85.
87. Commentators have named this due process interest an "expectation" interest.
See W. Lafave & J. Israel, supra note 1, § 20.2, at 785 ("protection-of-expectation the-
ory"); Westen & Westin, supra note 50, at 512. A few cases directly support the existence
of this due process expectation right. See, e.g., Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 18
n.8 (4th Cir. 1979) ("The commentators [cited previously] make a persuasive argument
that the allowance of specific performance relief, as in Santobello, can only be explained if
the constitutional right protected is, as they believe, one deriving simply from govern-
ment induced expectations of a proposal's fulfillment."); United States v. Minnesota Min-
ing & Mfg. Co., 551 F.2d 1106, 1111-12 (8th Cir. 1977) (although defendants could be
restored to status quo ante by rescinding their guilty pleas and suppressing all interim
incriminating statements, district court, under Santobello, could remedy the prosecutor's
breach by granting defendants specific benefit of state's promise not to prosecute them on
any additional charges); Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286,
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When the state breaches a plea agreement, a court may restore a de-
fendant to the status quo ante by vacating the plea agreement and grant-
ing immunity for any incriminating statements made during the plea
negotiations that otherwise might be admissible.8 It is significant that
the Supreme Court in Santobello, in addition to rescission, provided for
the remedy of specific performance,89 which entitles the defendant to the
fulfillment of his expectations under the agreement-his benefit of the
bargain.90 That this remedy was made available specifically to defendants
296 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 (1977) (where prosecutor made an un-
fulfillable promise to a defendant, defendant was held to have right to fulfillment of that
promise because "fundamental fairness and public confidence in government officials re-
quire that prosecutors be held to 'meticulous standards of both promise and perform-
ance.' ") (citation omitted); State v. Thomas, 61 N.J. 314, 322, 294 A.2d 57, 61 (1972)
(essential fairness dictates that defendant's expectations be protected); Commonwealth v.
Zakrzewski, 460 Pa. 528, 533, 333 A.2d 898, 900 (1975) ("It is settled that where a plea
bargain has been entered into and is violated by the Commonwealth, the defendant is
entitled, at the least, to the benefit of the bargain."); In re James, 96 Wash. 2d 847, 850,
640 P.2d 18, 20 (1982) (en banc) (per curiam) ("The law has over recent years created an
expectation that the State will keep its bargains unless the defendant has failed to keep his
or hers."); State v. Tourtellotte, 88 Wash. 2d 579, 584-85, 564 P.2d 799, 802-03 0977) (en
banc) (where prosecutor breached plea agreement, court held defendant was entitled to
benefit of the bargain).
Other courts imply a due process expectation right by allowing the trial courts, at their
discretion, to grant specific performance of the agreement, in light of the circumstances or
the case. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971); id. at 267 (Douglas, J.,
concurring); Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F.2d 286, 296-97 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 (1977); United States v. Brown, 500 F.2d 375,
378 (4th Cir. 1974); Correale v. United States, 479 F.2d 944, 949-50 (1st Cir. 1973); People
v. Newton, 42 Cal. App. 3d 292, 298, 116 Cal. Rptr. 690, 694 (1974) (citing Santobello, 404
U.S. at 263), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 937 (1975); State ex rel. Gutierrez v. Baker, 276 So. 2d
470, 472 (Fla. 1973); People v. De Wolfe, 36 A.D.2d 618, 618, 318 N.Y.S.2d 810, 811-12
(1971); Stewart v. Cupp, 12 Or. App. 167, 173, 506 P.2d 503, 506-07 (1973); State v.
Tourtellotte, 88 Wash. 2d 579, 584-85, 564 P.2d 799, 802-03 (1977) (en banc); W. Lafave
& J. Israel, supra note I, § 20.2, at 785.
88. Restoring the defendant to the status quo ante is in the discretion of the court.
See United States ex reL Anolick v. Commissioner of Correction, 393 F. Supp. 48, 51-52
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub non. United States ex reL Selikoff v. Com-
missioner of Correction, 524 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 951 (1976);
United States v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 551 F.2d 1106, 1111-12 (8th Cir. 1977)
(while court noted that returning defendants to their status quo ante was an option, it
nevertheless upheld trial court's dismissal of the indictment); Fed. R. Evid. 410. Courts
also have the discretion to award specific performance, which does more than merely
restore the defendant to his status quo ante, and supports the existence of an expectation
right of the defendant in the fulfillment of a plea agreement. See supra note 87.
89. 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971). In his concurrence, Justice Douglas stated that not only
should specific performance be provided as a possible remedy for defendants, but that in
granting relief, a court ought to consider a defendant's preference. Santobello, 404 U.S. at
267 (Douglas, J., concurring). See supra note 87 and cases cited therein.
90. The object of damages for breach of contract is to put the plaintiff in the same
position he would have been in had the contract been performed. This remedy is also
known as awarding the non-breaching party his expectation interest, or benefit of the
bargain. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 344, at 102-04 (1979); J. Calamari & J.
Perillo, supra note 133, § 14-4 at 521-22 (1977); D. Dobbs, Handbook on the Law of
Remedies § 12.1 at 786 (1973); Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70
Colum. L. Rev. 1145, 1147-48 (1970). In cases where money damages will not place the
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when the state breaches a plea agreement, supports the existence of such
an expectation interest. 91
When the prosecutor reindicts the defendant in contravention of their
plea agreement, the defendant usually asserts the agreement as a defense,
since the reindictment deprives him of his benefit of the bargain.92 Be-
cause the prosecutor is not bound to perform if the defendant materially
breaches,93 the issue then becomes whether the defendant has in fact ma-
terially breached. If he has breached the agreement, the prosecutor is
entitled to a rescission of the plea agreement.94 If he has not breached,
the defendant may be granted specific performance and the full benefit of
the bargain. 95
Although there are two possible sources of the defendant's due process
right, the first step of the due process analysis is resolved uniformly. The
defendant clearly has an "interest" for purposes of procedural due pro-
cess, and, therefore is entitled to a pre-deprivation hearing.96 The second
plaintiff in the position he would have been in had the promise been performed, the plain-
tiff may be awarded specific performance. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 359,
at 169 (1979); see also J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 68, § 16-1, at 581 (1977) (spe-
cific performance is available only when legal remedies are inadequate); D. Dobbs, supra,
§ 12.2, at 795-97 (1973) (same). See supra note 87 and cases cited therein.
91. See Cooper v. United States, 594 F.2d 12, 18 n.8 (4th Cir. 1979) ("[T]he commen-
tators [cited previously] make a persuasive argument that the allowance of specific per-
formance relief, as in Santobello, can only be explained if the constitutional right
protected is, as they believe, one deriving simply from government-induced expectations
of the proposal's fulfillment."); Palermo v. Warden, Green Haven State Prison, 545 F. 2d
286, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. dismissed, 431 U.S. 911 (1977) (where prosecutor made
an ultra vires promise, which was therefore unfulfillable, court enforced promise anyway
because of the great importance attached to promises made to a defendant by govern-
ment); W. Lafave & J. Israel, supra note 1, § 20.2(d), at 785-86; Westen & Westin, supra
note 50, at 513-17.
92. The defendant in such cases makes a motion to compel compliance with the plea
agreement or to dismiss the indictment. See Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358-
60 (1978); United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 887 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v.
Wood, 780 F.2d 929, 930 (lth Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 97 (1986);
United States v. Simmons, 537 F.2d 1260, 1261 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Donahey,
529 F.2d 831, 832 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976); State v.
Warren, 124 Ariz. 396, 401, 604 P.2d 660, 664-65 (Ct. App. 1979); State v. Yoon, 66
Haw. 342, 345-46, 662 P.2d 1112, 1114-15 (1983); Gamble v. State, 95 Nev. 904, 905-06, 604
P.2d 335, 336 (1979) (per curiam); State v. Hall, 32 Wash. App. 108, 109, 645 P.2d 1143,
1145 (1982).
However, in cases where the defendant bargains for a sentence recommendation and
the prosecutor breaches, the defendant often requests a vacation of the plea rather than
specific performance. See, e.g., Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 263 (1971) (where
defendant requested vacation of the guilty plea); Gamble v. State, 95 Nev. 904, 905-06,
604 P.2d 335, 336 (1979) (per curiam); State v. Makinson, 35 Wash. App. 183, 184, 665
P.2d 1376, 1377 (1983).
93. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
94. The government is then freed from its obligations under the agreement and may
reindict the defendant. See United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 887-88 (7th Cir.
1986); United States v. Wood, 780 F.2d 929, 932 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 97
(1986).
95. See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
96. See State v. Marino, 100 Wash. 2d 719, 723-25, 674 P.2d 171, 174-75 (1984) (en
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step in the due process analysis, which determines what process is due
within that hearing, however, is an issue over which the courts disagree.
In particular, courts have applied different standards of proof that the
government must meet to prove that the defendant materially breached
his plea agreement.
II. ANALYSIS AND APPLICATION OF THE STANDARDS OF PROOF
A. Standards of Proof Generally
Once it is determined that a pre-deprivation hearing is required, it
must also be determined what burden of proof is necessary within that
hearing to show a defendant's material breach. Courts have adopted
three different standards: beyond a reasonable doubt,97 clear and con-
banc); In re James, 96 Wash. 2d 847, 849-51, 640 P.2d 18, 20 0982) (en banc) (per
curiam); see also United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 888 (7th Cir. 1986) (discussing
when deprivation occurs for purposes of procedural due process, and therefore when a
hearing is required before the defendant may be deprived of an agreement); United States
v. Donahey, 529 F.2d 831, 832 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976)
(conducting a hearing before defendant is deprived of her agreement); State v. Warren,
124 Ariz. 396, 401, 604 P.2d 660, 665 (1979) (stating that a hearing and other procedures
are "constitutionally required"); State v. Hall, 32 Wash. App. 108, 110, 645 P.2d 1143, 1145
(1982) (providing defendant with a pre-deprivation hearing); State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d
406, 411-12, 316 N.W.2d 395, 398 (1982) (same); cf State v. Morley, 35 Wash. App. 45,
48, 665 P.2d 419, 420-21 (1983) (probation revocation hearing where the defendant is
accorded the same procedural safeguards).
97. In State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 412, 316 N.W.2d 395, 398-99 (1982), a defend-
ant and his accomplice were arrested for robbery and murder. The defendant made a
sworn statement that he did not participate in the homicide, and was allowed to plead to
the lesser robbery charge. See Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d at 408-09, 316 N.W.2d at 396-97. After
further investigation, however, the prosecutor's office discovered evidence that directly
contradicted the defendant's testimony and indicated that he, in fact, may have been
involved in the murder. Id at 409-10, 316 N.W.2d at 397. Although the defendant al-
ready had begun serving his sentence, a hearing was held to determine whether the de-
fendant had materially breached the agreement so that the prosecution would be freed
from its obligations and be allowed to charge the defendant with murder. Id. at 412, 316
N.W. 2d at 398. The court stated that the issue was whether the defendant had perjured
himself, since false testimony about his participation in the homicide would be a material
breach of his agreement. Ido at 411-14, 316 N.W.2d at 398-99. Applying a beyond a
reasonable doubt standard, the lower court had concluded, and the Wisconsin Supreme
Court agreed, that the defendant had committed perjury. Id. at 412, 316 N.W.2d at 398-
99. As a result, the court affirmed the vacation of the plea agreement and allowed the
prosecution to indict the defendant on charges of homicide. Id. at 420, 316 N.W.2d at
402. The purpose of the hearing was not to decide whether to convict the defendant of
either perjury or homicide, but only whether to set aside the plea agreement.
This high standard of proof may have been adopted because the defendant was alleged
to have breached his plea agreement by activity that connoted criminal activity. See
Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d at 421-23, 316 N.W.2d at 403-04 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting)
(though not stated outright, the dissent emphasizes the criminal nature of the activity);
Courts Can Vacate Plea Agreements, supra note 49, at 207 (1982) (stating that this was
appropriate in Rivest, because not only did the author feel that the standard was appro-
priate, but that the defendant should have been afforded a full trial rather than a hearing,
stating that "due process requires no less"). It is important to note that in several other
cases defendants were alleged to have breached their plea agreements by actions that
connoted criminal activity, but the fact of the breach was proven by a preponderance of
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vincing, 9 and preponderance of the evidence,99 without extensive discus-
sion of the reasons for adopting a particular standard."°°
The main purpose of a standard of proof is to minimize the risks re-
sulting from an erroneous decision. 10' In any judicial proceeding it is
impossible for the trier of fact to be absolutely accurate in its process of
factfinding. 0 The trier is able only to "aquire a belief of what probably
happened." 0 3 A standard of proof serves to inform the factfinder of how
certain society believes he should be in the correctness of the conclusions
of fact he draws in a particular type of proceeding. " Because the
factfinding process is inherently imprecise, a margin of error is antici-
pated, and the risk of error for each party is distributed according to the
value society places on the loss that each party would suffer as a result of
the evidence standard. See, e.g., United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 890 (7th Cir.
1986) (pejury); United States v. Donahey, 529 F.2d 831, 832 (5th Cir.) (false grand jury
testimony), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976); In re James, 96 Wash. 2d 847, 848, 640
P.2d 18, 19 (1982) (en banc) (per curiam) (defendant arrested prior to sentencing on two
misdemeanor charges); State v. Hall, 32 Wash. App. 108, 109-10, 645 P.2d 1143, 1145
(1982) (fraudulent misrepresentation of identity during and after plea negotiations).
Rivest, then, cannot be explained in terms of whether the breach was caused by the de-
fendant's criminal activity.
98. The court in State v. Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d 246, 288-89, 389 N.W.2d 12, 32 (1986),
is the only jurisdiction to adopt the clear and convincing standard, but it did so without
explanation. Although the court cited to State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 316 N.W.2d
395 (1982), for discussion of relieving a party of its obligations if the other party has
materially breached, the court did not explain, clearly overrule or mention the different
standards adopted in Rivest. See Bangert, 131 Wis. 2d at 288-89; 389 N.W.2d at 32.
99. The majority of jurisdictions have adopted this standard. The first court to do so,
State v. Curry, 49 Ohio App. 2d 180, 183-84, 359 N.E.2d 1379, 1382 (1976), did so without
explanation for its decision. Several courts have adopted the Curry standard or a case
relying on Curry, also with little or no explanation. See State v. Warren, 124 Ariz. 396,
401, 604 P.2d 660, 665 (Ct. App. 1979); State v. Marino, 100 Wash. 2d 719, 725, 674 P.2d
171, 174 (1984) (en banc); In re James, 96 Wash. 2d 847, 850, 640 P.2d 18, 19-20 (1982) (en
banc) (per curiam); State v. Morley, 35 Wash. App. 45, 48, 665 P.2d 419, 421 (1983)
(relying on In re James, 96 Wash. 2d 847, 640 P.2d 18, 19-20 (1982)); State v. Hall, 32
Wash. App. 108, 110, 645 P.2d 1193, 1195 (1982) (same). The Seventh Circuit in United
States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1986), is the only federal court that has dealt
with this issue, and the only court that has explained its decision in depth. See id. at 887-
95.
100. See supra notes 97-99.
101. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 757-58 n.9 (1982) (quoting Greenholtz v.
Nebraska, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979)); Greenholtz v. Nebraska, 442 U.S. 1, 13 (1979); Adding-
ton v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976);
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958).
102. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); United States v.
Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 403 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 370
(Harlan, J., concurring), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073
(1980).
103. In re Winship at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasis ommitted).
104. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 423 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369-70 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring);
United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 890-91 (7th Cir. 1986); Orloff & Stedinger, A
Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-of-the-Evidence Standard, 131 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1159, 1159 (1983).
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an erroneous finding in the proceeding.10 5
In a lawsuit there are always two types of factual error, each of which
entails certain consequences.106 The first type of error occurs when the
trier of fact renders an erroneous judgment in the plaintiff's favor."° In
the criminal context, this error results in the conviction of an innocent
man.10 8 The second type of error occurs when the trier of fact mistak-
enly renders a verdict in favor of the defendant."9 The criminal
equivalent is the aquittal of a guilty man.110 The possibility of either
error occurring is influenced by the standard of proof applied in a partic-
ular proceeding." 1 The higher the standard of proof placed on a party,
the more often an erroneous verdict will be rendered against him."'
Therefore, in selecting a standard of proof, the standard should be ad-
justed to reflect the importance society attaches to that party's interest at
stake as compared to the other party to the litigation.II 3
105. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 757-62 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
106. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979); United States v. Verrusio, 803
F.2d 885, 890 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring)) (mistaken judgment for plaintiff/prosecutor or mistaken judgment for de-
fendant); see also C. McCormick, Evidence § 341, at 962 (3d ed. 1984) (For civil cases, the
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof is adequate, since it is no worse to find
an erroneous judgment for the plaintiff than to find an erroneous judgment for the de-
fendant (the two types of erroneous outcomes)). The beyond a reasonable doubt standard
is necessary in criminal actions, however, where it is worse to make an erroneous judg-
ment in the prosecution's favor than in the defendant's favor).
107. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970); United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d
885, 890 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 0970)); C. McCor-
mick, Evidence § 341, at 962 (3d ed. 1984).
108. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); C. McCor-
mick, Evidence § 341, at 962 (3d ed. 1984).
109. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970); United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d
885, 890 (7th Cir. 1986) (quoting In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 0970)); C. McCor-
mick, Evidence § 341, at 962 (3d ed. 1984).
110. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); C. McCor-
mick, Evidence § 341, at 962 (3d ed. 1984).
111. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755-56 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-71 0970) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring); United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 890 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing In re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)); see also C. McCormick, Evidence
§ 341, at 962 (3d ed. 1984) ("[A] lawsuit is essentially a search for probabilities. A mar-
gin of error must be anticipated in any such search.").
112. See eg., United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 890 (7th Cir. 1986) (standard of
proof reflects the frequency of erroneous outcomes against each party) (quoting In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)); Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 765-66 (1982) (same); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979) (same); In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (same); C. McCormick,
Evidence § 341, at 962 (3d ed. 1984) (when a court uses beyond a reasonable doubt, the
court increases the total number of erroneous decisions against the prosecutor and simul-
taneously decreases the number of erroneous decisions against the defendant).
113. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755-60 0982); Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 423 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring);
United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 890 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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For example, in a civil suit the risk of error is usually distributed al-
most equally between the parties. The value at stake, usually money
damages, is deemed by society to be equally as serious to have an errone-
ous outcome in either party's favor." 4 On the other hand, in criminal
cases the risk of an erroneous conviction far outweighs the risk of an
erroneous acquittal, because society believes that it is far worse to convict
an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free. 1" Thus, the standard
of proof applied in a particular proceeding reflects the comparative social
utility of each party's interest at stake in the litigation, and adjusts the
relative frequency of an erroneous outcome for either party accord-
ingly. 16 If our society deems both interests to be of equal value, prepon-
derance of the evidence, as the lowest standard, is most appropriate."'
If one party's interest outweighs the other party's interest, however, the
standard should be raised.
C. Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
The Supreme Court has declared that the beyond a reasonable doubt
standard of proof1 8 is required by due process to prevent the possibility
that an innocent person will be convicted." 9 Because this standard is so
high, it increases the overall number of erroneous decisions in criminal
cases, yet simultaneously decreases the number of erroneous convic-
tions. 2° The Supreme Court has warned, however, that this standard
should not be applied too broadly or too casually in non-criminal
114. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 423 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); United
States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 890 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)); United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 403
(E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980);
W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra note 3, § 10.4, at 463-64; C. McCormick, Evidence § 341, at
962 (3d ed. 1984); Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 Stan. L. Rev.
1065, 1072 (1968).
115. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 423-24 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring);
United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 890 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)); C. McCormick, Evidence § 341, at 962
(3d ed. 1984); Kaplan, supra note 114, at 1073-74 (1968).
116. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 765-70 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970).
117. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 755 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 423 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring);
United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 890 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
118. Beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest of the three standards. In terms of
determining the overall probability of whether a particular fact in issue is true, it is sug-
gested that this level of proof is equivalent to finding that the fact in issue is "almost
certainly true." See C. McCormick, Evidence § 339, at 956 n.4 (1984).
119. See Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1972); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,
364 (1970); see also United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 891 (7th Cir. 1986); C.
McCormick, Evidence § 341, at 962 (3d ed. 1984); Kaplan, supra note 114, at 1073; 9
Wigmore on Evidence § 2497a, at 416 n.2, § 2498, at 419-20 (Chadbourn rev. 1981).
120. See supra note 112.
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cases. 121
The Supreme Court has promulgated guidelines for using the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard in criminal cases. In Lego v. Twomey,"2 the
criminal defendant argued that this higher standard should be adopted in
a pre-trial suppression hearing to determine the voluntariness of a confes-
sion. 123 The Court rejected this contention and held that because a sup-
pression hearing had nothing to do with the reliability of a jury verdict,
the beyond a reasonable doubt standard should not be adopted in that
type of hearing. 24
Because a criminal conviction is not directly at issue in pre-deprivation
hearings, 125 the reasonable doubt standard should not be used to deter-
mine whether a defendant materially breached a plea agreement. The
central issue in such hearings is whether the defendant's material breach
warrants vitiating the plea agreement.' 26 The validity of the waiver of
the fifth and sixth amendment rights is not at issue at this stage. Indeed,
the defendant is affirming the validity of the waiver by raising the agree-
ment as a defense to the reindictment. 27 Therefore, the due process in-
terest arising out of the waiver is not in jeopardy at the hearing. If a
defendant materially breached the plea agreement, it will be rescinded.' 28
Upon reindictment, all of the constitutional rights the defendant waived
to bind the agreement are reinstated, and he must be proven guilty of the
underlying charges beyond a reasonable doubt.' 29
The due process expectation right created by the government's prom-
ise to the defendant, 3" however, is more directly involved. Because the
121. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 768 (1982) (quoting Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979)); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 0979).
122. 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
123. See id at 482.
124. See id at 486-87 ; see also W. Lafave & J. Israel, supra note 1, § 10.4, at 463-64.
125. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
126. See United States v. Donahey, 529 F.2d 831, 832 (5th Cir.) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 828 (1976); United States v. Simmons, 537 F.2d 1260, 1261-62 (4th Cir.
1976); State v. Warren, 124 Ariz. 396, 401, 604 P.2d 660, 665 (Ct. App. 1979); Gamble v.
State, 95 Nev. 904, 908, 604 P.2d 335, 337 (1979); In re James, 96 Wash. 2d 847, 850-51,
640 P.2d 18, 20 (1982) (en banc) (per curiam); State v. Hall, 32 Wash. App. 108, 110, 645
P.2d 1143, 1145 (1982); State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 412, 316 N.W.2d 395, 398-99
(1982).
127. See supra note 92.
128. See supra note 65.
129. See United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 890-91 (7th Cir. 1986); see also
United States v. Perkins, 503 F. Supp. 1107, 1111 (S.D. Tex. 1980) ("A [d]efendant who
withdraws his guilty plea may be re-charged and tried both on the counts to which he
originally plead [sic] guilty and on those dismissed in return for the plea."); Gamble v.
State, 95 Nev. 904, 909, 604 P.2d 335, 338 (1979) (per curiam) ("If the court finds that
appellant deliberately and knowingly [breached his agreement], as the State alleges, the
proper course of action is to nullify the plea bargain, permit appellant to withdraw his
guilty plea, and allow him to plead anew."); State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 410, 316
N.W.2d 395, 397 (1982) (where state wished to prosecute defendant on a murder charge,
"the state would have to secure an order vacating the plea agreement").
130. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
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materiality of the breach determines whether the plea agreement
stands, 3' the defendant's expectation interest in that agreement, or bene-
fit of the bargain, is at stake.' 32 Because this expectation interest is so
closely analogous to the interest at stake in civil contract litigation,'
33
and because contract law seeks to protect the litigants' expectation inter-
ests, 134 the burden of proof used in such cases, a preponderance of the
evidence, 35 clearly is adequate to protect the defendant's interest.' 36
Although the beyond a reasonable doubt standard is also necessary to
protect innocent defendants from the social stigma that attaches to a
criminal conviction, 37 it is inapplicable in a pre-deprivation hearing. If a
defendant breaches and loses a plea bargain agreement, even if the deci-
sion is in error, the defendant is returned to his status quo ante: neither
convicted nor stigmatized.' 38
Finally, requiring the state to prove that the defendant materially
breached the agreement beyond a reasonable doubt discourages the state
from entering into mutually advantageous plea bargains.' 39 Requiring
proof beyond a reasonable doubt greatly increases the likelihood that de-
131. See supra note 65.
132. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
134. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 68, § 14.4, at 522 ("It has been pointed
out that a contracting party has three legally protected interests: a restitutionary interest,
a reliance interest, and an expectation interest .... The expectation interest represents the
prospect of gain from the contract."); D. Dobbs, Remedies § 12.1, at 786 (1973) ("The
traditional goal in awarding damages for breach of contract is to... put the non-breach-
ing party in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed.
This gives him the benefit of his bargain .... [which] give[s] him his expectancy and...
protect[s] his 'expectation interest.' ") (footnote ommitted); Farnsworth, Legal Remedies
for Breach of Contract, 70 Colum. L. Rev. 1145, 1147-49 (1970) (contract law protects
non-breaching party's expectation interests to encourage "promisees" to rely on promises
of others).
135. See J. Calamari & J. Perillo, supra note 68, § 14.8, at 528; see also C. McCor-
mick, Evidence § 339, at 956 (3d ed. 1984) (burden of proof in ordinary civil cases, of
which breach of contract actions are a common component, is preponderance of the evi-
dence); 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2498, at 419 (Chadbourn rev. 1981). In a few contract
actions, usually where there is a greater risk of unreliable evidence, such as where an
alleged contract is oral, or where there is a risk of stigma associated with the outcome,
such as where fraud is alleged, the standard of proof is often clear and convincing evi-
dence. See C. McCormick, supra, § 340, at 960-61 (1984); 9 Wigmore, supra, § 2498, at
419-24 (Chadbourn rev. 1981).
136. See, e.g., United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 894-95 (7th Cir. 1986); State v.
Warren, 124 Ariz. 396, 401, 604 P.2d 660, 665 (Ct. App. 1979); In re James, 96 Wash. 2d
847, 850, 640 P.2d 18, 20 (1982) (en banc) (per curiam).
137. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
138. See supra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
139. See United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 891 n.4 (7th Cir. 1986). Cf Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) ("Although Congress found a 'beyond a reasonable
doubt' standard proper in one type of parental rights termination case, another legislative
body might well conclude that a reasonable-doubt standard would erect an unreasonable
barrier to state efforts to free permanently neglected children for adoption.").
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fendants will breach their plea agreements with impunity. " Absent
some overriding societal benefit, 4 ' it is against society's interests to en-
courage defendants to breach their part of the bargain and yet retain its
benefits.1 4
2
D. Clear and Convincing
The clear and convincing burden of proof143 is used in "exceptional"
cases where the interest that one party has at stake is deemed more im-
portant than the interest of the other party, but not so important that it
requires a standard as high as beyond a reasonable doubt. 44 This stan-
dard of proof most commonly is employed in two types of cases.' 4
First, this standard is often used in a civil action when fraud or some
other type of quasi-criminal activity is alleged.'4 The defendant's inter-
est is deemed more substantial than a mere loss of money: the defendant
could suffer a tarnished or diminished reputation if found to have com-
mitted fraud. 147 Accordingly, the burden of proof is raised to a clear and
convincing standard.14 The stigma of conviction, however, is not a
threat to the defendant in a pre-deprivation hearing because a finding of a
material breach by the defendant results in vacation of the guilty plea
140. Raising the government's burden of proof increases the total number of erroneous
decisions in the defendant's favor. See supra note 112.
141. One example of such a benefit is the prevention of erroneous convictions. See
supra note 115.
142. See Ellison v. State, 56 Md. App. 567, 575, 468 A.2d 413, 417 (1983); see also
Brown v. State, 607 S.W.2d 801, 805 (Ct. App. Mo. 1980) ("Indeed to allow [the defend-
ant] to prevail would be to hold that he could profit by his violation of the agreement and
in effect obtain a reward for his own wrongdoing."), vacated on other grounds, 450 U.S.
1027 (1981); State v. Rivest, 106 Wis. 2d 406, 414, 316 N.W.2d 395, 399 (1982) ("To
allow a defendant to claim the benefit of an agreement where he, himself, is in default,
offends fundamental concepts of honesty, fair play and justice.").
143. The clear and convincing burden of proof is equivalent to a finding that the fact in
issue is "highly probably true." See C. McCormick, Evidence § 339, at 956 & n.4 (3d ed.
1984) (citing McBaine, supra note 118); McBaine, supra note 118, at 246. See also, W.
LaFave & J. Israel, supra note 1, § 10.4, at 463 ("highly probable").
144. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756-57 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441
U.S. 418, 427 (1979); Kaplan, supra note 114, at 1072; see also Bartels, Punishment and
the Burden of Proof in Criminal Cases: A Modest Proposal, 66 Iowa L. Rev. 899, 899
0981) ("[Beyond a reasonable doubt] is certainly higher than the 'clear and convincing
evidence' standard that is used in fraud cases and required in civil commitment
proceedings.").
145. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979); see also Bartels, supra note 144,
at 899 (naming two classifications of cases where this standard is most commonly
employed).
146. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979); United States v. Fatico, 458 F.
Supp. 388, 404 (E.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 1073 (1980); see also C. McCormick, Evidence § 340, at 959-60 (3d ed. 1984) (giving
examples of contract cases requiring the stricter standard of proof)); Bartels, supra note
144, at 899 (fraud).
147. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979).
148. See id
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and resulting conviction.'49 To the contrary, his material breach actually
serves to remove any prior stigma associated with a criminal
conviction. 150
Clear and convincing evidence also is required in proceedings in which
the defendant is threatened with a significant deprivation of liberty as
well as being stigmatized. 5 a Examples include when the defendant may
be institutionalized involuntarily for an indefinite period, 2 when the de-
fendant will be denaturalized 53 or deported,154 or when the defendant
may lose custody of his natural children.151
When a defendant is reindicted in violation of a plea agreement by a
prosecutor who claims that the state is excused from performance due to
the defendant's material breach, the interest at stake is a potential loss of
the defendant's benefit of the bargain.15 6 Although the interest is not
insignificant, it does not approach the same level of gravity as a more
significant liberty interest.157 If the defendant is incorrectly found to have
breached, he is tried on charges that were dropped or not filed pursuant
to the plea agreement. 5 1 If the defendant is declared not to have
breached his agreement, but he has in fact breached, he is protected from
prosecution on charges that were dropped or not filed because of the plea
agreement. 159
An argument can be made that because a plea agreement implicates
constitutional rights, it is a particularly important interest requiring a
higher burden of proof.'60 The fifth and sixth amendment rights that
give these agreements their constitutional element, however, are not
threatened at this stage. 6 ' In addition, the presence of constitutional
149. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
150. If the defendant is found to have materially breached the agreement, the guilty
plea is vacated and, therefore, the prior conviction is removed. See supra notes 128-29.
151. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 424 (1979).
152. Id. at 432-33.
153. See Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353 (1960); Schneiderman v. United
States, 320 U.S. 118, 125, 159 (1943).
154. See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966).
155. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982).
156. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
157. See United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 890-91 (7th Cir. 1986).
158. See id. at 890.
159. See id.
160. See United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 890-91 (7th Cir. 1986); cf Lego v.
Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486-89 (1972) (defendant argued that reasonable doubt standard
was required to determine whether a confession was voluntary because it implicated fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination; court held that preponderance of the evi-
dence was sufficient to satisfy due process); United States v. Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 332
(3d Cir. 1977) ("It is possible to argue that, since we are dealing with a significant consti-
tutional right... we should hold the government to a standard higher than a preponder-
ance, perhaps to proof by clear and convincing evidence. But such a standard is not
constitutionally required."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979).
161. The constitutional rights a defendant waives are concedely voluntarily and intelli-
gently waived, because the defendant affirms the agreement by attempting to enforce it,
and although the defendant may be tried thereafter, all the rights he waived are restored
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rights does not necessarily call for a higher standard of proof than a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 162 On the contrary, several pre-trial hear-
ings that infringe more directly on an individual's constitutional rights
require only a preponderance of the evidence to satisfy the accused's due
process requirements.
163
Although a clear and convincing standard may be appropriate for this
type of pre-deprivation hearing," it should be remembered that two im-
portant interests are to be considered in deciding which burden of proof
is most appropriate. While one is to assure that the defendant is given
due process, 165 the other is not to overburden the state with a standard so
high that it discourages the state from plea bargaining. 66 Failure to suf-
ficiently safeguard either party's interests carries the same risk of dis-
couraging plea bargains. 67 Although it might be argued that a clear and
convincing standard does not put the same burden on the state as a rea-
and he must be proven guilty of the underlying charges only upon proof beyond a reason-
able doubt. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 160.
163. One type of hearing determines whether a defendant is being tried in violation of
the guarantee against double jeopardy. A majority of the circuit courts of appeals that
have dealt with the issue hold that a preponderance of the evidence is sufficient to make a
double jeopardy determination. See United States v. Loyd, 743 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Olth Cir.
1984); United States v. Kalish, 690 F.2d 1144, 1147 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
1108 (1983); United States v. Booth, 673 F.2d 27, 30-31 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
978 (1982); United States v. Jabara, 644 F.2d 574, 576-77 (6th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Inmon, 568 F.2d 326, 332 (3d Cir. 1977), cerL denied, 444 U.S. 859 (1979). A second
type of hearing determines the voluntariness of a confession. See Lego v. Twomey, 404
U.S. 477, 488-89 (1972) (fifth amendment right against self-incrimination). After Lego, a
majority of states adopted the preponderance of the evidence standard. W. La Fave & J.
Israel, supra note 1, § 10.5, at 466. Other types of hearings include whether evidence
obtained in violation of the defendant's sixth amendment right to counsel could have
been acquired from an independent lawful source, see Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444
(1984), and whether a search violated the fourth amendment, see United States v. Mat-
lock, 415 U.S. 164, 177 (1974).
164. Courts are always free to adopt any standard they choose provided it is equal to
or higher than the minimum required under due process. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 433 0979); Lego v. Twomey,
404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972); W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra note 1, § 10.4, at 464.
165. The whole purpose behind the pre-deprivation hearing is to afford the defendant
the process that is due, because he has a due process interest in the plea agreement. See
supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 139.
167. See e.g., United States v. Verrusio, 803 F.2d 885, 891 n.4 (7th Cir. 1986) (court
stated that placing too high a burden on the government "might deter the government
from entering into plea bargains that benefit both parties," and thus required preponder-
ance of the evidence); United States v. Carter, 454 F.2d 426, 428 (4th Cir. 1972) ("There
is more at stake than just the liberty of [a] defendant. At stake is the honor of the govern-
ment ... and the efficient administration of justice in a federal scheme of government.");
State v. Tourtellotte, 88 Wash. 2d 579, 584, 564 P.2d 799, 802 0977) (en banc):
If a defendant cannot rely upon an agreement made and accepted in open court,
the fairness of the entire criminal justice system would be thrown into question.
No attorney in the state could in good conscience advise his client to plead
guilty and strike a bargain if that attorney cannot be assured that the prosecu-
tion must keep the bargain ....
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sonable doubt standard, and that courts should be encouraged to adopt
this higher standard, the clear and convincing standard still exceeds the
constitutional minimum required 6 ' and therefore, by definition, puts an
unnecessary burden on the state.
E. Preponderance of the Evidence
The most reasonable approach requires that the government prove the
defendant's material breach of a plea agreement by a preponderance of
the evidence.' 69 Because this standard adequately protects the defend-
ant's due process interests and is the constitutional minimum, no unnec-
essary burdens are placed upon the state. This standard adequately
protects the defendant without discouraging the essential process of plea
bargaining.
In a pre-deprivation hearing, the defendant stands to lose only an ex-
pectation interest in the state's performance of the plea agreement. 170 If
the plea agreement is vacated and he loses this expectation interest, the
constitutional rights he waived remain intact and are restored to him at
trial.'7 ' Although the defendant loses the benefit of leniency, there are
two reasons why this is not a valid consideration. First, the defendant has
no right to leniency.' 7 2 Second, using the expectation interest to argue
that an admittedly guilty defendant is somehow entitled to a lesser con-
viction and sentence undermines the purpose behind plea-bargaining.
The defendant plea bargains out of self-interest in as little punishment
and expense as possible.' 71 Yet, the purpose of such leniency in plea
bargaining is to conserve judicial resources, 74 and to exchange this
promise of leniency for other benefits to society, such as valuable testi-
mony in a criminal proceeding. 17 Raising the standard of proof to create
a right in defendants to leniency allows defendants to obtain this benefit
168. The preponderance of the evidence standard is the minimum standard required to
satisfy due process. See supra note 160.
169. It is suggested that the preponderance of the evidence standard, the lowest burden
of proof, is equivalent to a finding that the fact in issue is "more probable than not," see
W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra note 1, § 10.4, at 463 ("more probable than its nonexis-
tence"); see also, Gates v. Ashy Constr. Co., 171 So.2d 742, 746 (La. Ct. App. 1965) (fact
must be "more probable than not"), or "probably true", see McBaine, supra note 118, at
246 (probably has happened); see also Kaplan, supra note 114, at 1072 ("[T]hc
[factfinder] must... be satisfied that the probability is greater than 50 per cent .....
170. See supra note 156.
171. See supra note 129.
172. Although the defendant plea bargains because he desires the most lenient sentence
he can obtain, see supra note 2, the defendant is not entitled automatically to such leni-
ency. The defendant is given this option primarily in return for significant benefits to the
state, see supra notes 23 & 35-37. It cannot be maintained that the defendant has a
"right" to leniency because defendants do not even have a "right" to plea bargain in the
first instance. See supra note 27.
173. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
174. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
175. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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without giving the state its agreed return. 17 6 Therefore, only the defend-
ant's expectation interest is validly in need of protection in this hearing.
A defendant's expectation interests are adequately protected by the ap-
plication of contract law standards to a hearing on whether the defendant
materially breached his bargain.'7 7 Although a plea bargain is a consti-
tutional contract,1 78 none of the constitutional aspects of that contract' 79
are threatened in a pre-deprivation hearing." 0 In addition, one of the
main policy interests that contract law protects is the individual's expec-
tation interests in the enforcement of the contract. The standard of proof
required to prove a material breach of contract is preponderance of the
evidence.' If only the defendant's expectation interest is at stake, then
the standard of proof used in contract law is appropriate to protect it.
The balance of probabilities of erroneous outcomes demands a stan-
dard of proof that equally allocates the risk of error between the par-
ties-that is, by a preponderance of the evidence." 2 In this proceeding,
both parties risk losing only their benefit of the bargain, and the defend-
ant has no additional or more important rights at stake.
Finally, the preponderance of the evidence standard is adequate in this
type of proceeding, because other types of pre-trial hearings, which in-
volve an actual risk of loss of a constitutional right, require only a pre-
ponderance standard. 183
Thus, due process is satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard in hearings to determine whether a defendant has materially
breached a plea agreement because the defendant is threatened only with
a loss of his expectation interest in the agreement.
CONCLUSION
It is well established that a defendant has a due process interest in a
plea agreement that is derived from a waiver of fifth and sixth amend-
ment rights. 84 It is also established to some degree that defendants have
a due process interest in an expectation in the fulfillment of promises
made by the state.'8 5 Therefore, procedural due process guarantees a
defendant a hearing before the state can deprive him of an agreement.' 8 6
Once a due process interest has been established, courts should determine
what process is due a criminal defendant in that hearing.'87 The stan-
176. See supra notes 140 & 142 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 130-35 and accompanying text.
178. See supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 126-35 and accompanying text.
180. See supra notes 125-36 and accompanying text.
181. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 163.
184. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
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dard of proof used to determine whether a defendant has materially
breached his agreement must satisfy due process standards and comport
with the value society places on the interests of both prosecutor and de-
fendant.188 Courts should adopt a preponderance of the evidence stan-
dard at a pre-deprivation hearing to determine whether the defendant
has materially breached his plea agreement, as the minimum standard to
satisfy due process, because only the defendant's expectation interest is at
stake. Although the states are free to adopt a higher standard of proof,
89
doing so would adversely affect the public interest by overprotecting the
defendant's due process interests at the expense of placing a higher bur-
den on the state and discouraging the valuable and essential process of
plea bargaining. 90
Julie A. Lumpkin
188. See supra notes 165-67.
189. See supra note 168.
190. See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
